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Abstract
We investigate the short-term labor supply responses to a Conditional Cash Transfers
program in Peru. Rather than comparing treated and non-treated households, we
examine how benefit recipients change their labor supply after receiving the cash
transfer. Our empirical strategy exploits exogenous variation in the distance between
the program’s payment schedule and interview dates from the Peruvian National
Household Survey. Results suggest that cash recipients reduce their labor supply by
6–10 hours in the week following the payment date. This reduction in hours of work is
larger for married women and for mothers with children aged 5 or less. In addition,
results are robust to different specifications, changes in the sample and a placebo test.
JEL codes: I38, J22
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1 Introduction
Around the world, Conditional Cash Transfer programs (henceforth, CCTs) are con-
sidered powerful means to reduce poverty. By providing monetary transfers to families
conditional on a set of fulfillments, such as school attendance and health care of chil-
dren, the objective of CCTs is twofold. The first is alleviation of current poverty through
periodical stipends; allowing families to increase overall consumption. The second goal
is to reduce future poverty by increasing human capital of children, which is achieved by
means of program conditionalities.
During recent years, CCTs have received a great attention from policymakers and
academics, since significant reductions in poverty levels have been observed after their
implementation. Furthermore, these programs have been catalogued as one of the main
models of safety-nets in developing economies. After the success of programs such
as Bolsa Escola in Brazil and PROGRESA in Mexico “virtually every country in Latin
America has such a program” (Fiszbein and Schady 2009).
Most of the existing literature on the effects of CCTs has focused on scholastic achieve-
ment, health and nutritional outcomes of children. However, less attention has been paid
to the indirect effects that cash transfers could have on adults’ behavior. More specifically,
little is known about the effects of CCTs on adult labor supply. While cash transfers are
necessary to accomplish improvements in consumption, education and health, they can
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also generate incentives to reduce work intensity among adults, since this payment can be
thought of as a pure income effect.
Recent experimental evidence has shown small effects of CCTs on labor supply of
adults from beneficiary households (Parker and Skoufias 2000; Maluccio and Flores 2005;
Skoufias and Di Maro 2008; Galasso 2006; Foguel and Paes de Barros 2010). This lit-
erature relies on comparisons between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries to estimate
the so-called average treatment effect of CCTs on labor supply. Nevertheless, there is no
evidence on the immediate labor supply response to cash benefits.
This article deviates from the previous literature in two subtle but important ways. On
the one hand, this study represents the first attempt to analyze the transitory effects of
welfare programs, namely CCTs, on labor supply. That is, we do not aim to estimate the
average treatment effect of CCTs on labor supply. Instead, we are interested in exploring
whether benefit recipients change their labor supply after they receive the cash transfer.
On the other hand, we adopt a novel empirical strategy which exploits exogenous varia-
tion in the difference between the program’s pay dates and interview dates of a household
survey. The combination of pay dates and interview dates allows us to compare beneficia-
ries’ labor supply before and after receiving the cash transfer. We think of these deviations
as representing our contribution to the literature on the labor supply responses to cash
transfers.
There are several reasons why analyzing immediate labor supply responses to cash
transfers can be of particular interest. First, cash recipients are independent workers and
the available evidence suggests that such workers do not behave according to life-cycle
models of labor supply but instead they work “one day at a time” (Camerer et al. 1997;
Fehr and Goette 2007; Goette et al. 2004). Moreover, these studies argue that indepen-
dent workers (who are free to choose when and how much to work) are better described
as having income targets: once they reach their income target they stop working. Second,
beneficiaries of CCTs are, by construction, credit constrained. These restrictionsmay pre-
vent households to smooth consumption and leisure and, therefore, both variables may
react to the timing of cash transfers. Indeed, empirical studies have shown that consump-
tion of welfare recipients jumps up after the pay date and then declines (Shapiro 2005;
Mastrobuoni and Weinberg 2009). Third, benefit recipients of CCTs live in rural areas
where access to markets is quite limited. In such locations, every time beneficiaries are
paid, they must incur in transportation costs (money but also time). Therefore, these
short-term responses are relevant for the design of CCTs. In particular, the time that ben-
eficiaries spend picking up the money is an opportunity cost that policy makers should
take into account when choosing among alternative payment methods (bank deposits
versus cash-in-hand) and frequencies (monthly versus bimonthly).
We find that cash recipients (female household heads) hours of work are reduced by 6
hours in the week following the pay date. This reduction is rather large, since it implies
a decline of roughly 20% of their weekly hours of work. Moreover, this decrease in hours
of work is larger for married women and mothers with children aged 5 or less. However,
no significant effects are found for labor force participation, nor for the probability of
working for paid activities.We do not find significant effects of cash transfers on the labor
supply of recipients’ partners (when we restrict the sample to married recipients).
The document is structured as follows. Related literature is reviewed in Section 2. In
Section 3, we describe the program, named Juntos and its mechanics. Section 4 presents
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the econometric set-up and describes the data. Section 5 presents the results and addi-
tional robustness checks. In Section 6 we discuss our results and make comparisons with
respect to previous empirical findings. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature review
2.1 Theoretical considerations
Research on labor supply responses to welfare programs has long been a subject of inter-
est for economists, especially in developed economies where the expansion of benefit
transfer programs to low-income population was initiated during the 1960s. Since then,
researchers and policy-makers have been concerned on how welfare programs affect
working incentives of beneficiaries as well as the indirect (unintended) effects these
transfers may generate on non-targeted population living in localities covered by the
program.
For instance, the effect of welfare programs on labor supply has been widely studied.
The most prominent programs are Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), andmore recently the Food Stamp Program in the U.S.
along with the Working Families Tax Credit in the U.K. (see Moffitt 2002 for an extended
review and discussion). The discussion of how welfare participation affects labor supply
of adults can be divided according to (i) the predicted effects of the canonical model of
labor supply, (ii) program conditions, and (iii) models of household labor supply.
The potential effects of benefit transfers can be explained based on the basic static
model of labor supply. In this model, individuals maximize between consumption and
leisure facing a budget constraint, which is composed by labor (wage) and non-labor (ini-
tial wealth and monetary or in-kind transfers) income. In this study, we focus on the
particular role CCTs can play in determining working incentives1.
As pointed out by Alzúa et al. (2013), CCTs have four potential channels through
which adult labor supply could be affected. First, cash transfers represent an increment
in non-labor income. Given that no conditions are imposed with regard to labor effort of
beneficiaries, this lump-sum transfer is a pure income effect, and therefore, both employ-
ment and working hours are expected to decline. Second, program conditions can also
alter working behavior of adults. For instance, most of the conditions attached to cash
transfer programs imply school enrolment and a maximum number of days accepted for
children to be absent from school. This increase in school attendance of children allows
parents to augment labor participation and working hours as well, for they avoid allocat-
ing time in childcare. Third, if child labor is crucial in determining households’ budget
constraint, increasing school attendance would also affect adult labor supply. Fourth, cash
transfers can also affect local markets, and thereby, have an indirect impact on non-
beneficiaries. Using a sample from the Mexican PROGRESA program, Angelucci and De
Giorgi (2009) find that consumption of ineligible households increases in villages where
the program was randomly implemented. Alternatively, qualitative studies (Segovia 2001,
for example) have described the appearance of fairs ever since CCTs arrived to different
localities2.
Another important consideration is whether welfare programs impose arbitrary restric-
tions on adult labor supply in order to circumvent working disincentives. Despite the
initial unconditional intent related to working effort, some developed countries have
indexed program benefits according to the labor supply behavior of beneficiaries. For
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instance, the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program in the U.S. (for-
merly known as the AFDC) initially imposes that at least 20% of TANF recipients in each
State participate in work or work-related activities for a minimum of 20 hours per week.
These activities include regular employment, subsidized employment, commuting, on the
job training, and 12 months of vocational training for young beneficiaries aiming to par-
ticipate in the labor force. Alternatively, the EITC program, also in the U.S., consists in
a refundable tax credit for low- and medium-income families which increases according
to a standard range of annually labor income and the number of qualifying children in
the family3. These types of cash transfers, both conditional on minimum working hours
or increasing with earned income, act like a contract rigidity, not allowing individuals to
make optimal allocation of working hours. Thus, especially in the case of the EITC where
the benefit is attached to labor income, the response on individual working effort would
depend on which of the two possible effects - substitution or income - prevail. Empirical
findings suggest that it is participation (entry) rather than hours of work which responds
to the EITC4.
Unlike these “tied welfare benefits”, CCTs in Latin American do not restrict eligibil-
ity on labor force participation5. This lack of restrictions implies that the looseness of
the budget constraint due to the welfare benefit introduces a pure income effect, hence,
encouraging beneficiaries to demand more leisure. Further, if those individuals barely
ineligibles (say because of being just above the poverty line) reduce their working effort
in order to narrow down total income and “cheat” the system to become eligibles, then
the net effect of CCTs on labor supply would depend not only on the amount of reduced
working hours of the ever-eligibles and the formerly ineligibles, but also on the behavior
of the latter group once they have been selected as program beneficiaries and the transfer
has been received (e.g., they can return to their initial - optimal - working effort)6.
An open question is who in the family actually reduces his working effort. Since cash is
usually transferred to a particular household member (i.e., housewives), it is worth taking
into consideration howwelfare is distributed among familymembers. For this reason, the-
oretical considerations of models of household labor supply can also add useful insights.
In this line, aside from the potential effects of CCTs on individual adult labor supply, there
exists an open debate on whether families pool their welfare resources. According to this
hypothesis, family members act as if they are maximizing a single utility function. Two
separate models have been developed associated to this “unitary” behavior: the “agree-
ment” (Samuelson 1956) and the “dominant family member” frameworks (Becker 1981).
Maximizing a single utility function implies that, regardless of who receives the welfare
income, each of the family members would benefit from the monetary transfer through
an intra-family allocation process. In contrast to this “common will” frame, individual
cooperative utility models of intra-family bargaining processes (Manser and Brown 1980;
McElroy and Horney 1981; and Lundberg and Pollak 1993) as well as non cooperative bar-
gaining models (Lundberg and Pollak 1994) have also been postulated. In these models,
income is administered by a single agent within the family (for example, the mother) and
thus allocation of resources on consumption and leisure could differ across household
members.
Recent empirical evidence suggests that single cooperative utility functions prevail in
the family bargaining process. Regarding welfare benefits, Lundberg et al. (1997) test the
hypothesis of whether families pool their resources exploiting a U.K. policy change which
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dictated that child allowances were to be transferred exclusively to wives (mothers). The
authors find evidence that this policy change induced women to spend more resources
on women’s and children’s clothing relative to men’s clothing. In spite of labor supply,
Bertrand et al. (2003) suggest that drops in prime-age men’s labor supply are stronger
than that of prime-age women when the South African pension benefits are received by
women. In a recent study, Ardington et al. (2009) discuss that pension benefits could, in
the case of perfect resource sharing within the family, reduce hours of work and partici-
pation of adults, or in the case of imperfect credit markets, social pensions can be used as
a credit support for job seekers.
2.2 Empirical evidence from Latin American countries
To the best of our knowledge, seven empirical studies have been carried out addressing
the potential effects of CCTs on adult labor supply in Latin American countries. Identifi-
cation strategies of most of these studies are based on the fact of random treatment (most
of them at the village level) of the CCTs across the targeted population.
Parker and Skoufias (2000) exploit the experimental design of the Mexican PROGRESA
program (currently known asOportunidades), which randomly assigned treated and con-
trol villages, to address the question of whether CCTs alter labor participation and overall
leisure time of adults. The authors find no significant effects of program participation on
participation rates in the labor force. Instead, they do find that women are more likely to
reduce hours allocated to leisure mainly because of program commitments such as taking
children to schools, health centers and participating in community work.
In a later study, Skoufias and Di Maro (2008) evaluate the effects of PROGRESA on
outcomes measuring adult labor supply. Alike Parker and Skoufias (2000) their identifica-
tion strategy relies on a difference-in-differences estimation procedure comparing eligible
adults living in treated villages (beneficiaries) versus eligible adults living in non treated
low-income Mexican villages. The authors do not find statistically significant effects of
program participation on the probability of being employed. Moreover, given random
assignment of program deployment across villages, the authors find that cross-sectional
estimates of CCTs on working hours of adults living in treated villages are not statistically
different from working hours of adults living in (randomly) untreated villages.
Using a similar estimation methodology for the Nicaraguan Red de Protección Social
(RPS) program,Maluccio and Flores (2005) find that program participation reduces men’s
(but not women’s) working effort by 5.5 hours. Maluccio (2010) analyzes the effect of RPS
on the overall household labor supply; that is, the sum of each member’s labor intensity.
The author finds a negative small but statistically significant effect of the program on
household hours of work, especially in agricultural activities, and argues that this reduc-
tion can be explained based on the fact that these activities are perhaps associated to lower
marginal rates of return. In contrast, Foguel and Paes de Barros (2010) find no statisti-
cally significant effects of six Brazilian programs (Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Alimentação, Bolsa
Família, among others) on adult labor supply, neither on the extensive nor the intensive
margins.
Galasso (2006) uses propensity score matching and regression discontinuity methods
for evaluating the impact of Chile Solidario on adult labor supply. Although positive
impacts are found for the take-up of labor market programs, such as re-insertion and
training programs, the author finds no increments on the share of beneficiaries who are
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employed, nor on the share of beneficiaries who have a stable employment. However,
increases in participation rates in the labor force are observed only for rural areas.
Finally, Alzúa et al. (2013) find negative but small - if not inexistent - effects of three
different programs from Latin American countries (RPS in Nicaragua, PROGRESA in
Mexico, and Programa de Asignación Familiar in Honduras) on adult labor force par-
ticipation and the probability of migrating from agricultural to other working activities.
However, they do find a reduction of about 4.7 to 6.3 weekly hours worked in the case of
Nicaraguan RPS and a positive and significant effect of Mexican PROGRESA program on
male wages.
Most of the aforementioned studies rely on the experimental design of the different
programs evaluated, and most of them (with the exception of Galasso 2006 and Skoufias
and Di Maro 2008) fail to control for the possibility of reallocation of working effort
of ineligibles in communities or villages regarding program deployment, as pointed out
by Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009). Not taking into account this potential effect may
introduce negative bias (in absolute terms) to the parameters of interest assuming that
ineligibles are more prone to increase their labor intensity given the increase in the
demand for consumable goods and agricultural productive assets in days nearby the
transfer schedules. Because this potential increase in the demand of a particular set of
goods may increase real wages of ineligibles (introducing a substitution effect), previous
empirical findings based on double-difference comparisons are likely to understate the
labor supply responses to CCTs.
Unlike previous studies we adopt a different approach to measure labor force variations
as a response to welfare income. In particular, we are interested in exploring whether
working behavior changes in days near Juntos pay dates. Although this analysis does not
allow us to identify average treatment effects of program participation on working effort
of adults, it is useful for reconciling theoretical aspects of the canonical labor supply
model with empirical evidence. The advantage of examining short-term effects of cash
transfers on labor supply of adults is that: (i) it is possible to disentangle income effects
from general equilibrium effects often observed in the long run, and (ii) capture effects
of transfers itself and no other effects such as labor supply responses of parents to a
reduction in child labor introduced by the program.
3 The program and its mechanics
3.1 Background
The Peruvian Juntos program was implemented on April 2005 after a period of political
upheaval and relatively economic stagnation experimented at the beginning of the new
century during government transition. By 2002, with the new economic reforms brought
up by the former president Alejandro Toledo, the country’s economy began to recover
reaching growth rates above 5% by the mid-2000s. Together, the economic expansion and
the implementation of welfare programs focusing on poverty alleviation and job creation
lead to a significant increase of mean per capita income (from US$ 2,450 by 2005 to US$
4,050 PPP by the end of year 2010) and, more strikingly, a sharp reduction of roughly 50%
of the overall poverty rate which went from 54% in the mid-2000s to 27% by the end of
the last decade.
Particularly, Juntos periodically transfers a stipend to families living in poverty and
extreme poverty conditions, and in return, families must meet certain requirements
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including schooling and health care. The program was created with the aim of
strengthening government presence in remote areas of the country and providing eligible
families with a set of health, nutritional, educational, and identity services, for enhancing
health and nutritional status of pregnant women and their babies, nursing women, and
infants, as well as fostering human capital accumulation of children under age 14.
Juntos is still the most remarkable amid the social welfare programs in Peru, which has
generated the greatest impacts on poverty alleviation and human capital accumulation of
children. This can be noticed through the great expansion of the program since it began
to operate. By 2005, almost 22,500 households living in 26 municipalities benefited from
this program, whereas in 2012 Juntos was deployed in almost 1,011 municipalities, repre-
senting roughly 55.2% of the national territory and benefiting 649,553 households living
in poverty and extreme poverty conditions. Recently, Perova and Vakis (2012) found that
Juntos increased overall household income by 43% and was responsible of a 16% and
30% decrease in poverty and extreme poverty rates, respectively, in municipalities where
Juntos was initially deployed7.
In terms of investments, public expenditures generated by Juntos went from US$ 45
million in 2005 to US$ 177 million in 2007. In this latter year, there was a noticeable
expansion of the program along the Peruvian territory, covering almost 612 more munic-
ipalities and more than 400,000 households relative to the 2005 wave. By the end of 2012,
public expenditures associated to Juntos were calculated to be almost US$ 225 million.
This figure represents roughly 18% of the Peruvian expenditures in safety-net programs.
3.2 Eligibility
Juntos is a means tested program. As Perova and Vakis (2012) clearly describe, selection
of the beneficiary households consists in three steps. The first one is related to selection
of eligible municipalities. This selection is based on five criteria: (i) exposure to violence
during the late 1980s and early 1990s terrorism era; (ii) poverty level, measured as the
proportion of population with unsatisfied needs; (iii) poverty gap; (iv) level of under five
chronic malnutrition; and (v) presence of extreme income poverty.
The second step consists in a census of all households in eligible districts collected
by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (INEI). A proxy means formula
was used to determine household eligibility, based on poverty. Only households with
the presence of children under age 14 or pregnant women were selected. The algo-
rithm for defining eligibility of households is based on a Logit model, which estimates
the probability of a household living in poverty conditional on a set of observable
characteristics.
Finally, the third stage consists in community validation. This was done in commu-
nity assemblies, carried out by local authorities and representatives of the Ministry of
Education and Ministry of Health with the aim of minimizing inclusion and exclusion
errors. In general, final selection depends on community validation, and once the house-
hold is selected, the housewife (household recipient) must sign a letter in which the
household is committed to meet the co-responsibilities, and a health center or post is
selected in order for the beneficiaries to make their periodical medical checkups.
Once the household is enrolled in the program, transfers are given to the female head
of the household according to the payment schedule defined by the program’s adminis-
tration. According to the Peruvian National Household Survey (ENAHO, for its Spanish
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acronym), almost 99% of female heads reported to be receiving the transfer on a monthly
basis.
3.3 Components
Initially, the monthly amount was 100 Nuevos Soles (Peruvian local currency). This
amount is roughly equivalent to US$ 37 (in current dollars). Since 2010, however, the
amount was doubled (200 Nuevos Soles) but beneficiaries would receive the cash trans-
fer every two months so that the level of the annual amount remained unchanged (1200
Nuevos Soles). This change was introduced because of the low rate of money withdrawal
from bank accounts given the long distances beneficiaries must travel in order to pick up
the money. In our context, the monthly transfer was quite generous, representing over
50% of beneficiaries’ monthly per capita household expenditures.
Pay dates are defined at the village level which implies that some municipalities have
more than one payment date. Juntos sets a particular day in every village so we have some
within-municipality variation in payment dates. However, within a district, all payments
occur on the same week. This feature of the program does not represent a major problem
to our strategy as it will be shown in Section 5.
Once they receive the cash, beneficiaries are free to choose how they spend the
money. However, all beneficiaries must meet the following conditions: (i) children of ages
6–14 years attend at least 85% school classes; (ii) children of ages 0–59 months get fully
immunized and visit health centers where their growth is measured and vitamins are pro-
vided; (iii) children of ages 3–36 months get nutrition supplements; (iv) pregnant women
visit health clinics for prenatal care; (v) nursing women visit health centers for postna-
tal care; (vi) parents attend health clinics to receive information about nutrition, health
and hygiene; (vii) parents without ID (identification) attend the programMi Nombre (My
Name). Juntoswas initially intended as a program of temporary assistance to families, with
a duration of 4 years, conditional on households escaping from poverty. Yet, impover-
ished households can renew their participation for 4 more years with a benefit reduction
of 20%.
In 2009 there were two payment methods through which beneficiaries can receive the
cash transfer. The main way to receive the cash was to go to the local branch of the
Peruvian National Bank and withdraw themoney (54% of the beneficiaries in our sample).
The second way was to go to the main square of the village on the day of payment and wait
for an armored van which contained the money. The difference between these methods is
that the former allows the beneficiary to go to the bank at some other day while the latter
does not. Moreover, the armored van constitutes a deliver mechanism in which benefi-
ciaries do not spend much time in going to withdraw the money. Finally, both systems are




Differences between Juntos pay dates and ENAHO’s interview dates within a givenmunic-
ipality constitute the basis of our empirical strategy. In particular, we will explore whether
labor supply is reduced in the days near the pay dates. What we do in practice is to
compare beneficiaries, within the same municipality, who are interviewed just after the
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payment to those who are not. Given that most households members are engaged in agri-
cultural and highly-flexible occupations (i.e., independent workers), it is likely to observe
that individuals reduce their working effort in days following the cash receipt.
Though we exploit within-municipality variation in interview dates of ENAHO, our
measure of temporal distance is constructed as the difference between pay dates and
the week previous to the survey. This week prior to the interview day is called the
“reference week”. When interviewers survey households, they usually ask household
members whether they have done specific activities during the last seven days. For
instance, when asking about labor force participation, interviewers ask the following
question: “during the last week, from [day 1] to [interview day], did you have any job?”.
Given the way the survey is conducted, all outcomes related to labor supply of surveyed
members correspond to the seven days prior to the interview day (i.e., the reference week).
For the empirical analysis, we construct four dummy variables according to the distance
between the pay day and the reference week. Specifically, the first dummy variable is equal
to one if the pay date takes place, at least, two weeks before the reference week, and zero
otherwise. Similarly, the second dummy takes the value of one when the pay date occurs
one week before the reference week, and zero otherwise. The third dummy variable is
equal to one if the pay date happens some day during the reference week, and zero oth-
erwise. Finally, the fourth dummy variable takes the value of one when the pay date takes
place after the reference week, and zero if not8.
We divide the temporal distance between pay dates and interview dates in terms of
weeks for two reasons. First, as pointed earlier, within a given municipality there exists
a probability to observe more than one pay date. This is because administrative records
on pay dates are available at the village level, which is the smallest geopolitical unit in
Peru. Yet, ENAHO dataset contains geographical identifiers only at the municipality level
(which may contain more than one village). This data limitation forces us to collapse
administrative records containing payment dates by village at the municipality level in
order to merge them with the ENAHO dataset. When doing so, almost all villages (99.8%
in our sample) within a given municipality are observed to have pay dates during the same
week. Second, it has been observed that not all beneficiaries withdraw the money on the
very same pay date. For this reason, we assume a rather more parsimonious definition
of temporal distance which allows for some delay in order for beneficiaries to have the
money.
When observing a municipality with more than one pay date, we use the earliest pay
date to define the distance between payments and interviews. Though this criterion may
introduce measurement bias, we also perform additional regressions using the last pay
date within the municipalities to re-define temporal distance between payments and
interviews. In Section 5.3, however, we perform an additional sensitivity analysis to check
whether results hold when using exact payment dates.
Figure 1 depicts hours worked in the reference week for distinct groups of beneficia-
ries according to the distance (in weeks) between pay dates and the reference week. The
first group is composed of individuals who received the cash transfer two or more weeks
before they were interviewed (i.e., received the transfer at least two weeks before the ref-
erence week). Similarly, the second, third, and fourth groups are composed of individuals
for whom the cash transfer occurred one week before, during, and one week after the
reference week, respectively. The decline of hours worked during the reference week is
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Figure 1 Hours of work according to the distance between pay and reference week. Notes: Dark grey
bars correspond to hours of work during the reference week of recipient’s partners. Light grey bars
correspond to hours of work during the reference week of benefit recipients (housewives). Each pair of bars
represents weekly hours of work according to the temporal distance (in weeks) between the pay and
interview dates. “Two weeks before or more” implies that the payment was observed to occur at least two
weeks before the reference week. “One week before” implies that the payment occurred one week before
the reference week. “During the reference week” denotes that the payment occurred in some day
corresponding to the reference week. “One week after or more” denotes that the payment will occur one
week after the individual is surveyed.
linked to the week in which the transfer is received for all individuals included in our
sample, and this decline is largest among those who receive the cash transfer one week
before the reference week. Furthermore, this decline is larger for cash recipients than for
their partners. This greater decline in weekly hours worked can be interpreted as contain-
ing effects of (i) time spent in going to withdraw the money, (ii) time taken to spent the
money once it is received (i.e., purchasing consumption goods), and (iii) income effects.
The first two effects are related to the program’s features, and do not represent disincen-
tives to work. Thus, we are particularly interested in isolating the third effect from the
overall labor supply response to welfare transfers.
Based on the graphical evidence and exploiting within-municipality differences
between pay dates and interview dates (reference week), we estimate the following model:
yij = α +
∑
k
δkdij + X′iβ + λj + μij, (1)
where yij is the outcome variable (labor force participation, hours of work, etc.) of individ-
ual i living in municipality j, dij denotes the distance (in weeks) between the payment and
the reference week,Xi is a vector of individual characteristics, λj is a vector ofmunicipality
fixed effects, and μij is an error term capturing all other omitted factors. Our param-
eters of interest are denoted by δk , which measures the effect of the distance between
pay dates and interview dates. Therefore, these parameters are recovered using across-
municipalities variation in pay dates and within-municipality variation in interview dates.
In what follows, the omitted category is that the payment takes place at least two weeks
before the reference week (i.e., the first dummy variable).
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In this specification, each dummy may capture a specific effect related to the distance
between pay dates and the reference week. For instance, the second dummy variable,
“payment occurs one week before the reference week”, might capture effects related to
purchasing consumable goods with the cash received, whereas the third dummy vari-
able, “payment occurs during the reference week”, could capture effects related to the
time spent in going to the bank and picking up the money. The fourth dummy variable,
“payment occurs one week after the reference week”, may capture additional changes in
working effort of individuals in days prior to the cash transfer.
There are some caveats in our empirical strategy which are worth describing with fur-
ther detail. First, we only have information on pay dates established by Juntos but we fail to
observe the actual date the beneficiary went to the bank to withdraw the money. For this
reason, we assume that recipients withdraw the money within the week in which the cash
transfer was made available9. Second, it may be possible that when interviewers arrive
to a given municipality, they begin to survey families who work less (i.e., those who are
almost always present at home) and then survey families who work harder. If this were the
case, our estimates should be seen as a lower bound (in absolute terms), since those who
were surveyed earlier are more likely to be captured in the omitted category of distance
between pay and interview dates, and by construction, all our parameters of interest are
interpreted as a function of the omitted category. Thus, this omitted category captures
the average working intensity of individuals who were surveyed earlier, and are presumed
to have a lower labor intensity10. Finally, our indicators of distance between pay and inter-
view dates may capture other effects not related to the transfer but correlated with other
unobservable variables. For instance, it could be the case that pay days are established on
days when labor supply is low for a different reason than the transfer (e.g., holidays). To
check this is not the case, we perform falsification tests in Section 5.3.
Variation in pay and interview dates is crucial to our strategy. In Table 1, we present the
distribution of payment dates associated with the cash transfer from Juntos. Regarding
the day of the month, we do not find any special pattern. If anything, we could say that
there is a slight concentration around the third week of the month, between the 16th and
the 20th day. Regarding the day of the week, it seems that Mondays are the most common
day of payment while Sundays are the least frequent. The distribution of interview dates
is presented in the bottom half of the table. The frequency of dates looks pretty balanced
throughout the month. It is also worth noticing that almost all interviews are conducted
on Sundays, when most of the family members stay at home. Finally, the survey process
within a municipality has an average duration of 30 days.
4.2 Data
Our primary source of information is the ENAHO conducted in 2009 by INEI. The
ENAHO collects individual level information and is a nationwide representative survey,
both in urban and rural areas. We use information from the employment and income
registry, which restricts the sample only for individuals aged 14 or older. The ENAHO
has three important features. First, it includes several questions which allow us to accu-
rately identify households receiving monetary transfers from Juntos. This is particularly
important since the program design refers to women as the benefit recipients. Second,
this survey includes questions regarding relationship with the family head, enabling us
to distinguish the potential impact for different household members, say male heads and
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Table 1 Distribution of payment and interview dates
Panel A: Payment dates Frequency Percentage















Panel B: Interview dates Frequency Percentage







Day of the week
Sunday 3,780 99,97
Monday 1 0,03
Sources: Juntos administrative data (payment dates) and ENAHO surveys (interview dates).
female spouses (cash recipients). Finally, this dataset provides a rich set of variables that
allows us to construct different labor supply outcomes and include a wide set of controls
in our regressions.
To precisely estimate the impact of the proximity to the payment date on labor supply
outcomes we need a representative sample of all municipalities which are beneficiaries
from Juntos. By 2009, 638municipalities were part of the program. Given that the ENAHO
follows a stratified sampling procedure, this survey collected information in 260 munic-
ipalities enrolled in Juntos in this particular year. This represents roughly 40.8% of the
municipalities in which the Juntos program was present in 2009. Nevertheless, when
expanding the sample using the survey weights from the sampling design, Perova and
Vakis (2012) find that the number of households which report receiving cash transfers
from Juntos surveyed in the ENAHO2009 is very close to the actual number of beneficiary
households listed in the program’s official records. We therefore use sample weights in
all of our regressions and correct standard errors taking into account ENAHO’s sampling
design.
As an additional concern we check whether the transfer conditions are consistently
reproduced in each of the surveyed households. In other words, we check that (i) the
benefit recipient is the mother (female household head or the head’s spouse), (ii) women
report to receive 100 Peruvian Nuevos Soles (around 37 U.S. current dollars), and (iii) the
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frequency of transfers is monthly. Around 98% of the cash recipients in our sample are
women satisfying the mentioned conditions.
We also check that surveyed households who are receiving monetary transfers from
Juntos satisfy the eligibility conditions. Despite the fact that eligible households should be
below the poverty line in order to receive the transfer, our sample suggests that around
19% of the households are above the poverty line defined by INEI. We exclude non-poor
households from our empirical analysis below and discuss in Section 5.3 how including
these households can affect our results11.
Information on pay dates comes from administrative records provided by Juntos man-
agers12. As mentioned in Section 4.1, payment schedules are reported at the village level.
Unique municipality identifiers are used to match the information of payment dates from
the administrative dataset, previously collapsed at the municipality level, to the benefi-
ciaries sample built up from the ENAHO 2009. Our final sample contains information of
1,995 individuals living in 1,087 households enrolled in Juntos. Of these individuals, 1,615
live in poor conditions, whereas 380 are not poor according to the standard per-capita
daily expenditure measure. Variable averages and standard errors (reported in paren-
theses) are shown in Table 2. Each column reports summary statistics of all individuals
included in each of our four dummy variables defining temporal distance between pay
and interview dates.
4.3 Outcome variables
We focus on three different measures of labor supply: participation (extensive margin)
weekly hours worked (intensive margin) and working for paid activities. As described
above, each of the outcome variables are measured for the week before (reference week)
the interview (which usually takes place on Sundays).
Labor participation is a dummy variable which is equal to one when the individual
reported having worked or searching for a job any time during the reference week. To
measure labor intensity, we take the total number of hours worked during the same ref-
erence week. Lastly, the indicator for working for paid activities is relevant for evidencing
changes in labor supply alternative margins once the payment has already been done or is
about to occur (for instance, household members could reallocate time to family or home
production related unpaid activities once the cash has been transferred). The last two out-
come variables are defined only for those who reported having been employed during the
reference week.
Given that we have information of the number of hours worked on each day of the
reference week, we are also able to test whether individuals change their labor supply
behavior in a given day or whether they balance their labor intensity throughout the whole
week. This insight will be helpful when interpreting our main results.
5 Results
5.1 Main results
Table 3 reports the results for the equation of labor force participation. Each row indi-
cates the distance between the cash transfer receipt and the reference week. Columns
(3), (6), and (9) are our preferred specifications since they control for municipality fixed
effects as well as individual covariates (sex, age, educational level, marital status, indica-
tors for mother tongue, indicators for poverty status, an indicator for rural residence, and
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics (according to temporal distance between pay and reference
week)
Temporal distance between pay and reference week
Variable
At least two weeks One week During the At least one
before before reference week week after
Age 43.53 41.70 42.53 42.27
(12.16) (10.60) (12.29) (11.68)
Male 0.47 0.48 0.46 0.46
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Education level: No education 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.19
(0.39) (0.39) (0.38) (0.39)
Education level: Primary 0.60 0.67 0.64 0.63
(0.49) (0.47) (0.48) (0.48)
Education level: Secondary 0.21 0.14 0.18 0.17
(0.40) (0.34) (0.38) (0.37)
Education level: Tertiary 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
Mother tongue: Spanish 0.30 0.28 0.33 0.27
(0.46) (0.45) (0.47) (0.44)
Mother tongue: Quechua 0.61 0.71 0.62 0.68
(0.49) (0.46) (0.49) (0.46)
Mother tongue: Other 0.09 0.01 0.05 0.05
(0.28) (0.09) (0.22) (0.22)
Poverty condition: Extremely poor 0.40 0.47 0.43 0.47
(0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Poverty condition: Poor 0.37 0.39 0.36 0.35
(0.48) (0.49) (0.48) (0.48)
Poverty condition: Non poor 0.22 0.14 0.21 0.18
(0.42) (0.35) (0.41) (0.39)
Lives in rural area 0.90 0.77 0.83 0.86
(0.30) (0.42) (0.37) (0.35)
In labor force 0.95 0.93 0.93 0.95
(0.21) (0.25) (0.26) (0.22)
Weekly hours worked 30.66 29.25 30.19 31.77
(15.68) (15.91) (17.97) (16.22)
Worked for paid activities 0.55 0.58 0.53 0.55
(0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50)
Observations 563 425 442 565
interactions between indicators of distance between the payment date and the reference
week and the dummy variable determining whether or not the individual is the household
head). Results from these columns suggest that there are no effects of the cash trans-
fer receipt on labor force participation, even when splitting the sample by recipients and
recipients’ partners.
Table 4 shows results for the equation of hours worked in the reference week. For
the sample as a whole, there are no significant effects on the intensive margin. How-
ever, we find that having received the cash transfer within the seven days before the
reference week reduces about 5.7 hours of work in the reference week for recipients
only - see column (6). Recall that the effect of the transfer among recipients may
be driven by two possible confounding factors: time spent in transportation from the
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Table 3 Effects of temporal distance between pay and reference week on labor force
participation
All individuals Recipients Recipients’ partners
Transfer
occurred:




-0.028* -0.009 -0.009 -0.072** -0.044 -0.044 0.015* 0.006 0.148
(0.016) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.060) (0.060) (0.009) (0.007) (0.203)
During the
reference week
-0.027 -0.011 -0.011 -0.054* -0.046 -0.046 0.002 0.019 0.162
(0.017) (0.032) (0.032) (0.029) (0.059) (0.059) (0.012) (0.016) (0.206)
At least one week
after the
reference week
-0.011 -0.007 -0.007 -0.029 -0.024 -0.024 0.010 -0.001 -0.319
(0.014) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.047) (0.047) (0.010) (0.009) (0.336)
Municipality fixed
effects
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Additional
controls
No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 1,615 1,615 1,615 859 859 859 756 756 756
R-squared 0.003 0.144 0.144 0.008 0.284 0.284 0.005 0.280 0.280
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Additional controls include: an indicator for sex, an indicator for marital status
(married or living together), age, indicators for educational level (primary, secondary, tertiary), an indicator for Spanish
mother tongue, an indicator for poverty status, an indicator for living in rural areas, and interactions terms between an
indicator for household head and temporal distance between pay and reference week.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
location of residence to the bank and time spent in purchasing the goods or con-
suming the money once it has been withdrawn from the bank. If those who were
paid during the reference week have also anticipated the transfer date (and, there-
fore, have reduced their working hours) and have spent some time in receiving the
transfer, then the resulting point estimate for those who were paid one week before
Table 4 Effects of temporal distance between pay and reference week on weekly hours of
work
All individuals Recipients Recipients’ partners
Transfer
occurred:




-0.558 -1.899 -1.756 -1.640 -4.192* -5. 618** 0.241 -0.425 -0.726
(1.131) (1.840) (1.832) (1.398) (2.284) (2.397) (1.789) (2.903) (2.916)
During the
reference week
-0.294 -1.234 -0.972 -0.790 -0.594 -1.836 0.196 -1.537 -1.155
(1.164) (1.849) (1.835) (1.414) (2.213) (2. 367) (1.872) (3.017) (3.012)
At least one week
after the
reference week
1.308 0.678 0.996 0.992 3.802 2.573 1.614 -3.312 -2.332
(1.073) (1.825) (1.806) (1.300) (2.206) (2.295) (1.729) (2.918) (2.919)
Municipality fixed
effects
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Additional
controls
No NoZ Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 1,577 1,577 1,577 827 827 827 750 750 750
R-squared 0.002 0.259 0.259 0.005 0.395 0.395 0.001 0.419 0.436
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. See additional notes on Table 3.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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the reference week is not driven by these particular confounding effects. Nonetheless,
time spent in purchasing goods with the received money could also be affecting our
estimates13.
Table 5 reports the results for the equation of “working for paid activities”. Results do
not show a clear pattern regarding the effects of the distance between pay and interview
dates on working in a paid-job, even for different household members. Moreover, these
effects are statistically insignificant. One possible interpretation for the lack of effects of
the cash transfer receipt on the probability of working for paid activities is that there may
exist some rigidities in switching from unpaid to paid jobs in the very short run.
Given the results, all the remaining analysis is based on the short run effects of cash
transfers on hours of work. In the following lines we try to disentangle the potential
income effect generated by the welfare transfer from the aforementioned confounding
effects. To do so, we begin by exploring whether the reduction in working hours brought
up by the welfare transfer is evenly distributed along the whole week or if it is concen-
trated in a particular day or days of the reference week. Under the hypothesis that the
reduction in hours of work is being driven by time spent in purchasing goods (once we
control for the potential anticipation and transportation effects), one should expect that
the effect of the transfer is grouped in a particular day of the week (say, the day which is
closer to the payment date).
In Table 6 we report the resulting coefficients for every day of the reference week. Con-
sistent with the estimates shown in Table 4, we find negative and significant effects for
those who are paid within the seven days before the reference week. Specifically, we find
that working hours are reduced by roughly 1.3 hours in every day except for Sundays. In
addition, we find that hours of work on Thursday are reduced by 1 hour if payment occurs
during the reference week.
Overall, results show a decrease in hours worked when payment occurs in the refer-
ence week. This reduction is most likely to be driven by time spent on going to the bank.
Table 5 Effects of temporal distance between pay and reference week on working for paid
activities
All individuals Recipients Recipients’ partners
Transfer
occurred:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
One week before
the reference week
0.027 0.070 0.070 -0.019 -0.015 -0.015 0.004 0.028 0.027
(0.035) (0.065) (0.065) (0.037) (0.062) (0.062) (0.016) (0.024) (0.024)
During the
reference week
-0.020 -0.062 -0.062 -0.030 -0.086 -0.086 -0.026 -0.003 -0.005
(0.037) (0.065) (0.065) (0.037) (0.064) (0.064) (0.021) (0.026) (0.026)
At least one week
after the reference
week
0.005 -0.029 -0.029 0.001 -0.081 -0.081 -0.003 0.001 0.010
(0.034) (0.065) (0.065) (0.035) (0.065) (0.065) (0.016) (0.019) (0.021)
Municipality fixed
effects
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Additional controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 1,577 1,577 1,577 827 827 827 750 750 750
R-squared 0.001 0.047 0.047 0.001 0.358 0.358 0.004 0.402 0.436
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. See additional notes on Table 3.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 6 Effects of temporal distance between pay and reference week on daily hours of
work (recipients only)
Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
Transfer occurred: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
One week before the 0.828* -0.732 -0.810* -1.269** -1.319*** -1.334*** -0.982*
reference week (0.452) (0.494) (0.491) (0.498) (0.497) (0.514) (0.535)
During the reference 1.231** -0.183 -0.760 -0.783 -0.994* -0.644 0.297
week (0.500) (0.531) (0.527) (0.520) (0.534) (0.548) (0.552)
At least one week after 1.341*** 0.342 0.225 0.019 -0.084 0.074 0.656
the reference week (0.487) (0.453) (0.458) (0.470) (0.493) (0.459) (0.533)
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 827 827 827 827 827 827 827
R-squared 0.398 0.366 0.395 0.373 0.366 0.379 0.345
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. See additional notes on Table 3.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
However, when payment takes place one week before the reference week, the reduction
in labor intensity is evenly distributed along the reference week which is inconsistent with
the hypothesis that our results are mainly driven by transportation from the household to
the bank. We interpret these results as if the dummy variable representing that the pay-
ment wasmade “one week before the reference week” reflects the immediate disincentives
to work generated by the having received the cash transfer.
5.2 Heterogeneous effects
We next explore whether the decline in hours worked during the reference week is homo-
geneous across all recipients or if they differ according to their observable characteristics.
First, in Table 7 we divide the sample of recipients according to their marital status
(married and non-married). Interestingly, we find that the reduction in working hours of
recipients when the transfer was observed to happen one week before the reference week
is driven by the sub-sample of married women. The point estimate for married women
is -11.3 and is statistically significant at the 1% level, whereas the coefficient of the sub-
sample of non-married women is not statistically significant. One plausible explanation
for this difference is that married women also rely on their husbands’ income and this
allow them to reduce their working intensity more than non-married women.
Second, we analyze if there exists heterogeneity between old and young recipients. In
order to keep a balanced sample in both groups, we say that a recipient is young if she
is 40 years old or younger and she is old, otherwise. Table 8 presents results from this
specification. Results suggest that younger women (i.e., recipients aged 40 or less) reduce
more their working hours relative to older women. In fact, working behavior of older
women seems to be unaffected by the cash transfer receipt, since all the coefficients are
statistically insignificant. On the other hand, younger women reduce working intensity by
around 12 hours when the payment occurs one week before the reference week.
Third, we distinguish between recipients who have children aged 5 or less and those
who do not. This distinction is important because the presence of young children at home
is a major determinant in female labor supply. Results from splitting the sample according
to children’s age are presented in Table 9. As expected, recipients with children aged 5 or
less reduce their labor supplymore than recipients with older children. The point estimate
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Table 7 Effects of temporal distance between pay and reference week on weekly hours of
work bymarital status (recipients only)
Married Non-married
Transfer occurred: (1) (2) (3) (4)
One week before the reference week -2.318 -11.293*** -2.825 -2.620
(1.875) (3.667) (2.068) (4.647)
During the reference week -2.165 -6.788 0.088 3.899
(2.058) (4.599) (2.325) (4.557)
At least one week after the reference week -1.310 -1.808 3.246 5.252
(1.745) (3.823) (2.023) (4.344)
Municipality fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 446 446 381 381
R-squared 0.072 0.540 0.063 0.540
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. See additional notes on Table 3.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
of having received the cash transfer one week before the reference week is -9.96 hours for
recipients with young children. This could suggest that recipients reduce their hours of
work in order to spend this additional time in activities related to child rearing.
5.3 Robustness analysis
5.3.1 Changes in the sample and different specifications
Though distance between program’s pay dates and ENAHO’s interview dates is presum-
ably exogenous, the estimates in the previous sectionmay be capturing some confounding
effects. First, the way we construct the temporal distance when observing more than one
pay date in a given municipality could introduce measurement bias, attenuating our esti-
mated effects. Second, there still some additional effects which have not been discarded
in previous estimates, downwardly biasing our results. In particular, the way in which
time spent in going to withdraw the money can affect the results has not been discussed,
and can erroneously be interpreted as a disincentive effect to work. Third, results can be
sensitive to the inclusion of non-poor beneficiaries in the sample. Finally, our measures
Table 8 Effects of temporal distance between pay and reference week on weekly hours of
work by age group (recipients only)
Young (under 40) Old
Transfer occurred: (1) (2) (3) (4)
One week before the reference week -4.224** -11.985*** -0.502 -2.088
(2.035) (4.350) (1.919) (4.887)
During the reference week -3.163 -8.396* 0.841 4.143
(2.211) (4.671) (2.186) (4.883)
At least one week after the reference week -0.897 -2.033 1.881 7.796
(1.845) (3.750) (1.893) (4.814)
Municipality fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 411 411 416 416
R-squared 0.061 0.544 0.058 0.553
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. See additional notes on Table 3.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 9 Effects of temporal distance between pay and reference week on weekly hours of
work by children’s age (recipients only)
With children With children
aged 5 or less aged 6 or more
Transfer occurred: (1) (2) (3) (4)
One week before the reference week -4.346** -9.962** -0.637 -6.152
(1.822) (3.878) (2.209) (4.867)
During the reference week -0.336 -3.830 -2.747 -2.149
(1.903) (4.900) (2.664) (5.689)
At least one week after the reference week 0.686 1.870 -0.624 4.646
(1.618) (3.548) (2.256) (5.791)
Municipality fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 447 447 354 354
R-squared 0.080 0.511 0.042 0.563
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. See additional notes on Table 3.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
of distance between pay and interview dates can be capturing effects other than income
effects, affecting the interpretation of our results.
We begin our robustness checks by exploring whether the inclusion of non-poor fam-
ilies in our sample could yield different results. To the extent that poor beneficiaries can
live in more remote areas and have less access to transportation, results shown in the
previous section can represent lower-bound estimates. In Table 10 we report the results
for weekly hours of work after including non-poor beneficiaries in our sample. Results
correspond to recipients only. All the estimated coefficients are negative and statistically
significant at the 1% level. In our most preferred specification (i.e., including municipality
fixed effects and controlling for individual characteristics), we find that having been paid
one week before the reference week reduces working intensity by around 6 hours.
The estimated effects are also larger than those presented in Table 4, where we exclude
non-poor families. This additional evidence suggests that the decline in hours of work is
not driven by the time needed to withdraw the money, since non-poor beneficiaries are
more likely to spend less time going from home to the bank. Moreover, this difference
Table 10 Effects of temporal distance between pay and reference week on weekly hours of
work, including non-poor beneficiaries (recipients only)
Transfer occurred: (1) (2) (3)
One week before the reference week -2.632 -4.881** -5.998**
(1.329) (2.466) (2.408)
During the reference week -1.564 -0.685 -1.948
(1.319) (2.583) (2.597)
At least one week after the reference week 1.024 3.071 2.251
(1.225) (2.251) (2.275)
Municipality fixed effects No Yes Yes
Additional controls No No Yes
Observations 1,015 1,015 1,015
R-squared 0.009 0.340 0.354
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. See additional notes on Table 3.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
2014, 3:2
http://www.izajold.com/content/3/1/2
Fernandez and Saldarriaga IZA Journal of Labor & Development Page 20 of 30
may suggest that non-poor beneficiaries’ labor supply is more elastic (with respect to cash
transfers) than that of poor beneficiaries.
As an attempt to dissipate concerns related to measurement errors, we next construct a
different measure of distance between pay and interview dates. Recall that our measure of
“recentness” of the cash transfer is defined as the distance in weeks between the pay date
and households’ interview dates within a given municipality. Nevertheless, a municipality
could have more than one pay date, since Juntos payment schedule is defined at the village
level. Up until now, we have used the earliest date to construct our measures of distance
between pay dates and the reference week.
In Table 11 we present results when constructing the indicators of distance using the last
date of payment within the municipality. We only include recipients in the regressions. In
columns (1) to (3) we exclude non-poor recipients while in columns (4) to (6) we include
them in the sample. When controlling for recipients characteristics, results suggest that
poor beneficiaries reduce their weekly hours of work by 4.85 (statistically significant at
the 5% level) when the cash transfer occurred one week before the reference week. This
reduction in weekly hours of work is larger (-5.97 hours) when including non-poor house-
holds in the sample (column 6) and is statistically significant at the 5% level. Coefficients
reported in columns (3) and (6) of Table 11 are similar to those reported in column (6) of
Table 4 and column (3) of Table 10, respectively, where we use the same samples and the
first date of payment within the municipality to define temporal distance. The evidence
presented on this table suggests that the impact of having received the cash transfer one
week before the reference week on hours of work does not significantly change when we
modify the definition of the municipality-payment date.
A major threat to our identification strategy is that the dummy variables denoting the
distance between payment and interview dates may be capturing other factors not related
to the cash transfer, but to the specific date of the payment. For instance, it could be
the case that payment dates are established on days when the labor supply is low for a
different reason than the transfer (e.g., holidays). This potential correlation between dates
and unobservable variables that affect hours of work would invalidate our strategy. To
check that this is not the case, we perform a falsification test using available data from
non-beneficiaries. If the dummy variables representing the distance between payment
Table 11 Effects of temporal distance between pay and reference week on weekly hours of
work using the last pay date within municipalities (recipients only)
Poors Poors and non-poors
Transfer occurred: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
One week before the reference week -1.229 -3.781 -4.847** -2.118 -5.194* -5.970**
(1.646) (3.171) (2.461) (1.570) (2.983) (2.905)
During the reference week -1.049 1.595 0.817 -1.503 0.803 -0.094
(1.612) (3.344) (3.437) (1.506) (2.957) (3.016)
At least one week after the reference week -0.951 2.238 1.550 -0.450 1.538 1.044
(1.346) (2.718) (2.187) (1.287) (2.536) (2.520)
Municipality fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Additional controls No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 827 827 827 1,015 1,015 1,015
R-squared 0.001 0.392 0.432 0.003 0.339 0.384
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. See additional notes on Table 3.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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and interview dates were correlated with other variables that affect labor supply, they
should also have an impact on the hours of work of non-beneficiaries.
We perform regressions for weekly hours of work including in the sample spouses of
household heads who are not beneficiaries from Juntos but who live in treated munic-
ipalities. Table 12 presents the results from these regressions. Results show that none
of the dummies measuring the distance between pay and interview dates are signifi-
cant at any conventional level. We interpret these results as if our indicators of distance
are not correlated with omitted variables that may affect labor supply by alternative
channels.
Finally, we perform an additional specification that allows us to rule out the hypothesis
that our results may be driven by the time spent picking up the money. In particular, we
perform two separate regressions according to the program’s payment method in order
to rule out this possibility. Recall that there exist two payment methods: deposits to bank
accounts and delivering cash in armored van. The former implies that beneficiaries go to
the bank and withdraw the money through ATM, whereas armored vans distribute the
money to beneficiaries in the main square of their village. This second payment method
was introduced to reach the most remote places of the Peruvian territory and does not
require beneficiaries to move long distances in order to pick up the money. Thus, the
effect of temporal distance between interview and payment dates on labor supply for ben-
eficiaries who received the cash transfer via armored vans does not contain confounding
factors such as time spent in withdrawing the money.
Table 13 reports the results for weekly hours of work divided according to the pay-
ment mechanism. Columns (1) and (2) correspond to the bank account mechanism, and
columns (3) and (4) correspond to payment through armored vans. All the regressions are
performed for recipients only. Coefficients for “bank account” are not statistically signifi-
cant at any conventional level. In contrast, coefficients for “armored van” are statistically
significant at the 1% level when including the full set of controls. In particular, work inten-
sity of individuals for whom the cash transfer was made by armored vans is reduced by
8.8 hours when the transfer occurred 1 week before the reference week. We interpret this
result as if the reduction in hours of work is purely due to an income effect and is not
related to the time spent going to the bank.
Table 12 Effects of temporal distance between pay and reference week on weekly hours of
work (non-beneficiary housewives)
Transfer occurred: (1) (2) (3)
One week before the reference week -0.054 -0.799 -0.210
(1.542) (3.021) (3.024)
During the reference week -1.603 -2.155 -1.997
(1.557) (2.831) -(2.793)
At least one week after the reference week 3.352 2.211 2.099
(1.663) (2.848) (2.790)
Municipality fixed effects No Yes Yes
Additional controls No No Yes
Observations 927 927 927
R-squared 0.010 0.333 0.348
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. See additional notes on Table 3.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table 13 Effects of temporal distance between pay and reference week on weekly hours of
work by payment mechanism (recipients only)
Bank Armored van
Transfer occurred: (1) (2) (3) (4)
One week before the reference week -3.195* -0.913 -2.335 -8.807**
(1.839) (4.353) (2.087) (3.056)
During the reference week -0.670 7.421 -2.835 -6.207
(2.275) (4.529) (2.119) (3.864)
At least one week after the reference week 0.201 11.202* -0.418 -1.006
(2.082) (6.448) (1.763) (2.667)
Municipality fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Additional controls No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 369 369 458 458
R-squared 0.086 0.478 0.060 0.400
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. See additional notes on Table 3.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
5.3.2 An alternativemeasure of temporal distance
Additional concerns about the econometric approach can be related to the way tempo-
ral distance is defined. In this section, we construct an alternative measure of temporal
distance based on the exact date of payment and interview dates. More specifically, since
we observe hours of work for every day of the reference week and the municipality pay-
ment date, we can calculate the exact number of days between the pay day and each of
the days in the reference week. Moreover, since we have exactly 7 different observations
for each individual (associated to the seven days of the reference week), we can per-
form fixed effect regressions at the individual level using temporal distance in days as the
independent variable.
Panel A of Table 14 reports the results from the linear specification. Columns with even
numbers include only poor recipients, whereas columns with odd numbers allow for the
inclusion of non-poor recipients in the sample. The first two columns use the earliest pay
date and the last two columns use the last payment date within a given municipality to
define the number of days between the cash transfer and the “reference day” (the day for
which hours of work are reported). That is, each individual’s hours of work are measured
in 7 different reference days. The point estimate for poor recipients is 0.127 (statistically
significant at the 1% level), suggesting that hours of work go up by 0.127 hours per day
when the cash transfer occurs after the reference day. When including non-poor benefi-
ciaries in the sample, the point estimate rises to 0.131, and is also statistically significant
at the 1% level. A similar pattern is observed when using the last payment date within
the municipality.
In Panel B of Table 14 we present the estimated coefficients associated to dummy vari-
ables indicating the number of days between the pay day and the reference day. For the
sake of simplicity, we construct 10 such variables, each representing the number of days
between the cash transfer and the reference day. In particular, we include in the regres-
sions indicators for cash transfer occurring 1 day, 2 days, 3 or 4 days, 5 or 6 days, and 7 or
more days after (or before) the reference day. The omitted category is when the pay day
and the day of report are the same (i.e., temporal distance between pay and the reference
day is equal to zero). Results show that working hours are reduced when the cash trans-
fer occurs before the day in which individuals report their working behavior. The largest
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Table 14 Effect of temporal distance between pay and reference day on daily hours of
work (recipients only)
Payment date within municipalities
Earliest pay date Latest pay date
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A
Coefficient on linear specification 0.127*** 0.131*** 0.119*** 0.123***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.025) (0.039)
[0.523] [0.546] [0.489] [0.557]
Panel B
Transfer occurred (with respect to the reference day):
At least 7 days before 0.157*** 0.109*** 0.123** 0.173***
(0.044) (0.034) (0.041) (0.053)
5or 6 days before -0.288** -0.268* -0.230* -0.196*
(0.116) (0.156) (0.101) (0.091)
3 or 4 days before -0.434** -0.489** -0.339 -0.432**
(0.228) (0.204) (0.243) (0.213)
2 days before -0.251 -0.266 -0.252 -0.209
(0.237) (0.212) (0.212) (0.221)
1 day before 0.053 -0.067 -0.039 0.051
(0.234) (0.209) (0.249) (0.219)
1 day after 0.180 0.174 0.178 0.263
(0.244) (0.219) (0.256) (0.227)
2 days after 0.343 0.313 0.442* 0.448**
(0.247) (0.223) (0.257) (0.230)
3 or 4 days after 0.243 0.203 0.326 0.380*
(0.231) (0.209) (0.242) (0.217)
5 or 6 days after 0.829*** 0.818*** 0.962*** 1.023***
(0.263) (0.241) (0.278) (0.252)
At least 7 days after 1.132*** 1.203*** 1.267*** 1.134***
(0.276) (0.253) (0.294) (0.277)
[0.520] [0.610] [0.519] [0.537]
Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,789 7,105 5,789 7,105
Number of individuals 827 1,015 827 1,015
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. R-squared in brackets.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
decline in hours of work occurs when the payment was observed to happen 3 or 4 days
before the day of report, and becomes negligible when the pay day gets closer to the day
of report of working behavior.
In Figure 2 we plot the estimated coefficients along with their 95% confidence intervals
according to the distance (in days) between the pay day and the reference day. We use day
0 (i.e., cash transfer occurred the reference day) as the benchmark dummy variable. The
figure clearly describes a U-shaped pattern, implying that working intensity is reduced
when the cash transfer was made within 5 days before the reference day and remains at
its normal level when cash transfers occur after the reference day.
6 Discussion
Along the document, we have argued that, although CCTs may not have long-term or
permanent effects on labor supply of adults, it may be the case that individuals reduce
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Figure 2 Coefficients on temporal distance (in days) between pay and reference day. Notes: Each point
in the graph corresponds to a coefficient associated to a dummy variable measuring the temporal distance
between pay and reference day (day in which the hours of work are reported). The omitted category is
“distance between pay and reference day equals 0”, which implies that the pay and the reference day are the
same.
their working intensity in the short-term as a response to welfare transfers. Our empirical
analysis is based on the plausible assumption that payment schedules of Juntos are orthog-
onal to interview dates of ENAHO survey, and, using this identifying assumption, we are
able to construct measures of temporal distance to test whether the recentness of cash
transfers affects benefit recipients’ labor supply. In particular, we find that working hours
of recipients are reduced when the cash transfer was observed to happen within one week
before the interview took place. In this section we discuss some possible paths through
which it is possible to observe short- but not long-term effects of welfare transfers on
labor supply of adults.
Results shown in Section 5.3 suggest that declines in working intensity aremostly driven
by married women in their childrearing ages. As discussed by Moffitt (1992), there is a
voluminous empirical literature supporting the idea that divorced or separated women
have a more inelastic labor supply relative to women living in husband-wife (or mari-
tally stable) families. There exist several explanations for these observed differences. The
absence of a male with income to help support the children is the most common expla-
nation. Two-parent families not only have the capability of generating more income since
both parents can work for paid activities, but can also allocate more efficiently the time
devoted to parenting practices. In contrast, child bearing and work in female-headed
houses are both mutually exclusive activities. Therefore, the income effect generated by
the welfare transfer is more likely to affect women living in husband-wife families.
Time not devoted to work can be re-allocated to parenting activities or, more broadly,
home production. However, this implies that activities in which beneficiaries are involved
might be such that they can freely switch between home production and paid job at any
point of time (highly flexible activities). In the specific case of the Peruvian Juntos pro-
gram, del Pozo and Guzmán (2011) find that the welfare transfers increase the likelihood
of owning small animals, such as poultry and guinea pigs, as well as the use of land for
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growing natural grasses (which are used to feed guinea pigs). Moreover, authors find
that income generated by selling small animals as a fraction of household total income is
greater for program beneficiaries relative to non-treated households. Since raising small
animals has become a profitable business that might be carried out as part of household
activities, it is likely that program beneficiaries - in particular housewives - have turned to
this activity as a compliment of their home-related duties, and which allow them to earn
labor income while taking care of their children.
Aside from the working incentives welfare transfers may generate and the way in which
time is allocated across home production and work effort, it is important to emphasize
that results shown in the empirical analysis correspond to short-term responses of work-
ing behavior to welfare transfers and might not be taken as program’s average treatment
effects. As discussed in the literature review, most of the studies evaluating the effect
of CCTs on labor supply (in Latin America) do not find significant changes in working
behavior of adults. However, “disincentive effects on adult labor supply are found only
for the program that made the most generous transfers, the RPS in Nicaragua” (Fiszbein
and Schady 2009). This piece of evidence suggests that income effects generated by wel-
fare transfers may depend on the amount of the transfer relative to individual’s earned
income14.
The observed decrease in working effort of recipients in the short run can be explained
from consumption patterns over time. If the welfare transfer allows households to achieve
a higher consumption bundle over a certain period of time (say, during periods in which
the cash transfer has recently been made) but not permanently, it is likely that the income
effect would be visible only in the short run. However, when the cash transfer has been
totally spent, labor supply must increase in order to afford the initial (i.e., out-of-welfare)
consumption bundle. Put it differently, welfare transfers can “buy” leisure as long as a cer-
tain level of consumption has been achieved. Below this threshold, labor supply increases
and returns to its initial level. Thus, if the cash transfer is sufficiently large to afford higher
levels of consumption during a long period of time, then this would generate a perma-
nent decrease of labor supply of individuals. This insight can explain why CCTs giving
more generous stipends are observed to have disincentive effects on labor supply of adult
beneficiaries.
7 Conclusion
It is well-known that welfare programs in developed countries may have unintended
effects on labor supply (Ashenfelter 1983; Moffitt 2002). Conditional Cash Transfer pro-
grams are not the exception. However, empirical evidence from Latin American countries
does not seem to be consistent with the income effect predicted by the standard model
of labor supply. Evidence drawn from experimental and quasi-experimental evaluation
methods is associated with the long term effects of program participation on adult labor
supply. Although these empirical approaches allow researchers to accurately identify
average treatment effects of welfare programs on different set of outcomes, it does not
come without its drawbacks. In the specific case of adult labor supply, particular con-
cerns should be given to general equilibrium effects potentially introduced by program’s
benefits, and indirect effects generated by the reduction in child labor.
In this paper we adopt a novel empirical approach which allow us to estimate short
term effects of cash transfers on adults’ working effort. In particular, we exploit within
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municipality exogenous variation introduced by the temporal distance between payment
schedules of the Peruvian Juntos program and interview dates of the Peruvian National
Household Survey to explore whether the monthly receipt of cash transfers affect work-
ing behavior. Despite the fact that we cannot estimate average treatment effects, this
empirical approach is useful for isolating immediate effects on labor supply generated by
program stipends from other potentially confounding factors.
We find that women’s (but not men’s) weekly hours of work are reduced by almost 6
hours in the week following the payment date. This effect is mainly driven by married
(maritally stable) women and by mothers with children aged 5 or less. However, no effects
are found for labor force participation, nor for working for paid activities. These results
are robust to changes in the sample, different specifications, and alternative measures of
temporal distance.
Some interesting implications arise from our findings. From an academic perspective,
we reconcile empirical evidence with the theoretical predictions of the standard model of
labor supply. In this regard, although income effects are not observed in previous studies
analyzing the impact of CCTs on adult labor supply in the sense of working disincentives,
we do find that, in the short run, these effects are likely to appear. The absence of long
term effects of cash transfers on working effort can be attributed to transfer’s generosity
and consumption patterns over time. The latter implies the way households maximize
consumption in days near pay dates relative to more distant days.
For evaluation purposes, special attention should be paid to general equilibrium effects
and changes in the labor market composition potentially introduced by CCTs. With
respect to the former, it is possible that, within targeted communities, reductions in labor
force participation generated by the introduction of welfare transfers can increase wages,
therebymitigating the predicted income effects. In fact, Alzúa et al. (2013) find that house-
hold earned income increase as a result of increases in wages among male beneficiaries
when analyzing the Mexican PROGRESA program. Regarding labor market composi-
tion, there is some evidence on changes in working activities. For instance, del Pozo and
Guzmán (2011) find that women are more likely to work closer to home. Likewise, Adato
and Roopnaraine (2004) find that adult males work longer in their own parcels relative to
their counterparts when assessing the Nicaraguan RPS.
From a policy perspective, different issues arise. First, changing the amount and fre-
quency of the payments could, as suggested by Fiszbein and Schady (2009), amplify the
immediate labor supply response to cash transfers. Second, as an attempt to minimize
the decrease in hours of work, pay dates could be defined on days when labor supply
is expected to be low (e.g., weekends). Third, policy makers should take into account
the trade-off they face in terms of payment methods: bank deposits can be operationally
cheaper but they impose larger transportation costs (not only money but also time) than
delivering cash in armored vans.
Finally, we believe that our empirical approach could be useful to answer other
related outcomes that might respond to the receipt of the cash transfer. For instance,
we could examine if households change their regular consumption pattern during the
week after the payment (e.g., going to restaurants instead of eating at home). Also, it
would be relevant to check whether cash recipients do not lose control over the money
once they arrive home. If potential disputes within the household arise after the pay-
ment, we could test whether there is an increase in domestic violence during these
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days. It would also be relevant to examine whether children’s school attendance (or
education-related expenses) increase after the pay date. These are promising avenues
for future research that may expand the discussion about the benefits and limitations
of CCTs.
Endnotes
1In general, welfare programs can be divided according to the type of benefits: cash
and in-kind transfers. Ashenfelter (1983), Moffitt (1992), and Moffitt (2002) provide
outstanding reviews of cash transfer programs. For a review of the relationship between
in-kind benefits and labor supply, see Currie (1994), Yelowitz (1995), Blundell and
MaCurdy (1999), Moffitt (2002), and Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2009).
2Other studies suggest that individuals are likely to invest in agricultural related
productive assets. In a recent article, Duflo et al. (2011) document that demand for
agricultural tools tend to increase on days close to pay dates
3In order to qualify, children must be 18 years old or under (with few exceptions
accepting families with children “permanently and totally disabled” aged 19 or above),
must be somehow related to the claimant (blood, marriage or law), and must be resident
of the United States.
4Other See Eissa and Hoynes (2006) and references therein.
5This is not the case for the Chilean Chile Solidario program, since one of the
conditions for eligibility is that unemployed household members should be enrolled in
local employment offices.
6See Moffitt (2002) for a further examination of this particular scenario.
7There does not exist an extensive literature evaluating Juntos impacts on program
beneficiaries. Most of the studies evaluating Juntos are based on qualitative analysis of
program’s impacts (Escobal and Benites 2012, Alcázar 2010). Until this date, Perova and
Vakis (2012), Sánchez and Jaramillo (2012), and del Pozo and Guzmán (2011) constitute
the only quantitative studies of this program. The latter two studies evaluate program’s
impacts on nutritional status of infants and household’s productive investments and
agricultural production, respectively.
8See the Appendix for further detail on variables definition.
9It is worth noting, however, that this would be true only in villages where the
payment method is through bank deposits, but not in villages where beneficiaries go to
the main square on the pay day and wait for the armored van. We use this feature of the
program to perform additional sensitivity tests in Section 5.3.
10Cash transfers were usually made available during the third week of the month, and
interviews in a given district usually began during the first days of the calendar month
and lasted almost 30 days. Based on this information, those who were interviewed at the
end of the month, are more likely to be captured in the dummy variables encompassing
individuals who received the transfer “during the reference week” or “one week after the
reference week”.
11The reason underlying the filters of non poor households as part of the Juntos
beneficiaries can be explained based on poverty transitions (households being initially
poor and then escaping from poverty once they had already been selected as
beneficiaries) and program administrative failures (non poor households selected as
beneficiaries even when the program was initially targeted to households below the
poverty line).
12This information is also available at: http://www.juntos.gob.pe/cronograma_
transportadora.php.
13It is worth noting, however, that the reduction in working hours occurs in the
reference week. This implies that, if there exists an effect encompassing time spent in
consumption of goods, then it is likely that this effect should appear just after the transfer
has been done, but not in the reference week (seven days after the payment date).
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14One important consideration regarding the lack of evidence of negative effects of
welfare transfers on labor supply is the timing in which program evaluations are made.
As discussed by Fiszbein and Schady (2009), most of the existing studies use data
collected shortly after the households have become eligibles to participate in the
program for the first time. However, it may take some time before households adjust
their working behavior to welfare benefits.
Appendix
Program’s features
Eligibility Consists of three stages: (i) selection of eligible municipalities (based on
poverty level, under age 5 chronic malnutrition, and exposure to violence during
1980s and 1990s); (ii) selection of eligible households (based on Logit model
measuring the probability of a household living in poverty); (iii) community
validation (community assemblies carried out by local authorities and government
representatives)
Cash transfer 100 Nuevos Soles (US$ 37) per month
Conditions (i) children ages 6–14 attend at least 85% of yearly school classes; (ii) children
ages 0–59 months old get fully immunized and attend periodically to growth
controls; (iii) children ages 3–36 months get nutrition supplements; (iv) pregnant
women visit health clinics for prenatal care; (v) nursing women visit health clinics
for postnatal care; (vi) parents attend health clinics to receive information about
nutrition, health and hygiene; (vii) parents without ID (identification) attend to
programMi nombre (My name).
Payment methods (i) bank deposit and (ii) cash delivery with armored van
Variables definition
Reference week Seven days before the interview day
Reference day The day of the reference week for which hours of work is reported
First pay date The first (earliest) pay date within a municipality
Last pay date The last (latest) pay date within a municipality
Outcomes (i) participation: a dummy variable which is equal to one if the individual had
a job or looked for one in the reference week, and zero otherwise; (ii) hours of work:
hours worked in the reference week (or in the reference day); (iii) working for paid
activities: a dummy variable which is equal to one if the individual had a paid-job
in the reference week, and zero otherwise
Variables of temporal distance between pay dates and the reference week (i) payment
takes place, at least, two weeks before the reference week; (ii) payment occurs one
week before the reference week; (iii) payment takes place during the reference week;
(iv) payment occurs after the reference week. Omitted category: payment takes
place, at least, two weeks before the reference week
Additional samples
Placebo sample Non-treated housewives (female heads who are not enrolled in the
program) who live in municipalities covered by Juntos
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